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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.
2
SUPREM1E COURT OF MIISSOURI.
3
SUPREM1E COURT OF MICHIGAN.
4
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS. 6
ADMIRALTY. See Errors and Appeals.
AMENDMENT. See Trial.
BANKRUPTCY. See Husband and Wie ; Partnershi.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Sunday.
Endorser's Liability-Parol Eidence-Agency.-An endorser of a
negotiable promissory note cannot escape liability to a subsequent endorsee
for value and without notice, by showing that his endorsement was not
made until after he had received the money for which the note was
given, and that it was then made for the sole purpose of passing title to
the endorsee, and under a verbal agreement with the agent of the latter
that the words "without recourse" should be written over the endorse-
ment: Lewis v. Dunlap, 72 Mo.
Endorsement by one not a Party-Proof that he is a Guarantor-
Discharge of by fidlare to pursite Jaker.-W here W., who apparently
has no connection with the promissory note in question, sells and assigns
the same before due, and endorses his name thereon in blank; and he
is the first and only endorser of the note; and afterwards he is sued
thereon by the person to whom he sold the same, and he sets up the
following defence: That he sold and assigned the note before due, and
endorsed the same as guarantor, and that at the time he sold the
same, and at the time that the same became due, the maker thereof was
perfectly solvent, and the note could have been collected from him
by the exercise of reasonable diligence ; but that afterwards the maker
became insolvent; and that no notice was given to the defendant of the
non-payment of the note until nearly four years had elapsed after the
same became due, and was then given at a time when the note
could not be collected from the maker because of his insolvency.
Held, that the defence was sufficient; that want of due diligence on
the part of the guarantee will discharge the guarantor to the amount of
the loss sustained: Withers v. Berry, 25 Kans.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Taxc.
Au thority to City to subscribe to Stock- What Words do not give-
Popular Vote- Cannot cure want of -authority.-The constitution of a
% Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1880. The cases will probably be reported in 13 Otto.
I From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 52 Wis. Reports.
S From Thomas K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 72 Mo. Reports.
A From Henry A. Chaney, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 43 MIich. Reports.
6 From A. M. F. Randolph, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 25 Kansas Reports
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state provided that the legislature should not authorize a city to become
stockholder in a corporation, unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of
such city, at a regular or special election, should assent thereto. Sub-
sequently a charter was granted to a city, providing that it should have
power to subscribe for stock in a railroad upon the vote of a majority
of the resident taxpayers. Reld, that read in connection with the con-
stitutional restriction, the charter gave no power to subscribe for stock,
but was only intended to add an additional restriction to that imposed
by the constitution :. Allen v. City of Louisiana, S. C. U. S., October
Term 1880.
The fact that two-thirds of the qualified voters gave their assent
would not validate a subscription by such city, the legislative authority
to obtain the popular assent being as essential to the validity of the
election as it is to the subscription: Id.
CON-rRACT.
Interpretation of-nstruction to Jury-Expert Testimony entitled to
weight.-In an action upon a contract to furnish stone enough to com-
plete a certain bridge and its approaches, the question being, whether
certain work found to be necessary upon the completion of the bridge,
constituted part of the "approaches," it was error to refuse an instruc-
tion that, in determining what was intended to be embraced in the
contract, the jury should consider what was the condition of things at
the time it was made, and not the condition as developed by the opera-
tions of nature years afterwards: Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Clopper,
S. C. U. S., October Term 1880.
It was also error to refuse an instruction, that the testimony of
experts, experienced in bridge building, was entitled to due weight as
to whether certain work, spoken of as a dyke, was part of the bridge or
approach: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Practice-Right of Private Counsel for Prosecution to address Jiry-
Conduct of Jurors and Bailiff in charge of Jury- Threats by Son not
evidence against Father-Allocution of the Judge in cases not Capital.
-It is not error to permit an attorney assisting the state's attorney in
the prosecution of a criminal case to make the opening statement to the
jury. R. S. sect. 1908: State v. Stark, 72 Mo.
While it is improper for a juror in a criminal case to ask advice of
the officer in charge of the jury in relation to the case, and equally im-
proper for the officer to communicate such inquiry to the prosecuting
attorney, yet if the officer made no response to the juror, and it is shown
that the defendant was not in any way prejudiced, such inquiry of the
officer and communication by him to the prosecuting attorney will fur-
nish no ground for setting aside a conviction : .d.
In the absence of evidence of conspiracy between father and son, an-
tecedent threats made by the son against the life of the defendant are
not admissible in evidence on behalf of the defendant upon the trial of
an indictment for an assault upon the father: Id.
On a conviction of an offence not capital, the omission to enter of
record the allocution, or the formal address of the judge to the prisoner,
asking him if he has anything to say why sentence should not be pro-
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nounced against him, is not an error for which the judgment should be
reversed: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Husband and Wife.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES. See Partnership.
DONATIO MoRTIS CAUSA.
Contract for the benefit of Wife.-One C., in anticipation of his own
death, sold a carriage, agreeing with the purchaser that the price was
to be paid in farm produce, to his (O.'s) wife. C. having died : Held,
that his widow, and not the executor, was entitled to the benefit of
the sale: Scruggs v. Alexander, 72 Mo.
EQUITY.
Election of remedy-Laches-Equitable remedy outlawed.-It seems,
that bringing suit against only one of several persons to recover an entire
sum received by him under a constructive trust, but divided with the
others, should preclude separate suits against the rest, if the complain-
ant had full knowledge of their interests when he elected to sue a par-
ticular defendant: German American Seminary v. Kiefer, 43 Mich.
Equity will not interfere where, with full knowledge of the facts,
suit on a merely constructive trust has been delayed until many of the
persons concerned in the transaction are dead, and the recollection of
the others is such that the court must be in doubt whether the case
established by the evidence is not partial and misleading; !d.
Courts of equity will not encourage the splitting of causes of action
and needless litigation: Id.
An equitable action of assumpsit, if it lies at all, will be outlawed by
the same lapse of time as bars an action at law, particularly if it rests
on a merely constructive trust, and the defendant has always denied the
equity and relied on an adverse claim: Id.
Relief against Mistake of Law when not Granted.-Mere ignorance
of the law on the part of a party to a contract will not authorize a court
of equity to set aside the contract. There must be something more.
The attending circumstances must be such as to excite suspicion of
fraud, imposition, misrepresentation or undue influence on one side, and
imbecility, credulity or blind confidence on the other. Upon this prin-
ciple, where it appeared that defendant had believed himself not legally
bound to pay plaintiff's claim, but plaintiff's attorney had pressed him
for payment, insisting that he was bound, and had prevailed upon him
to execute a note for the amount, but it did not appear that he had
relied upon the attorney's opinion, nor what were the considerations
which induced him to accede to the attorney's demand, and there was
no testimony tending to create a suspicion even of fraud, imposition,
misrepresentation or undue influence; Held, that even if plaintiff's
claim was originally unfounded, equity would not relieve defendant
from payment of the note : Dailey v. Jessup et al., 72 Mo
ERoRS AND APPEALS.
Jurisdiction-Amount in Controversy-Joint Salvage award-Ap-
portionment amcng Salvors.-Where suit is brought by a number of
VOL. XXIX.-62
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salvors to recover for a joint salvage service, and the whole amount
awarded is sufficient to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction, the owners
of the property saved will not be deprived of their appeal because the
court below apportioned the recovery among the salvors according to
their respective merits, and some received less than $5000 : Sinclair V.
Cooper, S. 0. U. S., October Term 1880.
EVIDENCE.
Acknowledgment-D2uting Certificate.-Certificates of acknowledg-
ment may be impugned by proof of fraud or duress, but not by a mere
denial of the facts certified, made on oath by the party purporting to
make the acknowledgment, and opposed by equally strong evidence in
support of such certificate: Johnson v. Van Velsor, 43 Mich.
Foreign Law.-Foreign statutes should, when possible, be proved as
provided for in the state laws and the acts of Congress, rather than by
the testimony of a lawyer who has practiced within the jurisdiction
where they are in force: Kopke v. The People, 43 Mich.
Statements of one Partner.-Where two persons are sued as partners,
and the question of partnership is put in issue, the statements of one of
such persons in the absence of the other, is not evidence against the
other that they are partners: Johnston v. Clements, 25 Kans.
Telegram-Proof of-Secondary Evidence.-Where the controversy
is not between the sender and the person to whom a telegram is addressed,
and the contents of such message is material, the original message, if
not lost or destroyed, must be produced, it being the best evidence; and
in case of its loss or inability to produce it from other cause, the next
best evidence the nature of the case will admit of must be furnished.
If there is a copy of the message existing, it should be produced ; if
not, then the contents of the message should be shown by parol testimony:
Barons v. Brown, 25 Kans.
Where the telegraph operator, having the possession of the books and
papers of the office at C., testified there was not in his office any of the
messages forwarded from the office on April 26th 1878, but he su posea
all such messages had been destroyed, as it was the custom to destroy
them after six months, and then presented a book of the office which
he said he supposed was in the handwriting of the operator who preceded
him at the office. Held, the preliminary proof was insufficient to au-
thorize the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents of the
message in question. Held, further, that as the only entry or memo-
randum in the book concerning the supposed destroyed message was as
follows: " H. & B. to Q. l. & Co., Ks., nine words," such entry was
inadmissible as original or other evidence. Held, also, as the book was
not an account or shop-book, or any register or record recognised by law
as evidence, it was error to admit it or the entries therein for the con-
sideration of the jury, and its admission in this case, having been highly
prejudicial to the defendants, is sufficient cause for the reversal of the
judgment: Id.
If the original message could not be produced, and if no copy of such
message existed, the person making such entries in the office book, when
called upon to testify to the contents of the message, might have used
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the book to refresh his memory concerning the messages sent from the
office while he was operator 
: Id.
Written Contract-Parol Evidence to Explain.-Where a written
contract is uncertain as to matters affecting the liabilities of the parties,
parol evidence of the situation of the parties and of the subject-matter
is admissible to aid in its construction : Wilson v. Morse, 52 Wis.
Where there is any uncertainty or ambiguity in a written contract,
the construction subsequently put upon it by the parties themselves, as
evinced by their conduct, may be shown to aid the court in construing
it: 1d.
EXECUTION.
Exemption-Stock in Trade-Failure to make Selection.-The
statute which exempts from execution the "tools and implements, or
stock in trade, of any mechanic, minor or other person, used or kept for
the purpose of carrying on his trade or business, not exceeding two
hundred dollars in value" (subd. 8, sect. 2982, R. S.), held to apply
to the stock of goods on sale by a merchant; Wicker v. Comstock,
52 Wis.
In general, where a debtor's whole stock in trade, exceeding in value
$200, has been seized, his neglect or refusal to select the specific
articles which he will retain as exempt, is a waiver of his right to the
exemption; but if the officer refuses to give him an opportunity to
make a selection, or denies his right to any exemption, the want of
actual selection by the debtor will not be a waiver of his right: Zietke
v. Morgan, 50 Wis. 560, distinguished: Id.
EXPEaT. See Cbntract.
FRAUD. See Husband and Wife.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See Insurance.
FOREIGN LAW. See Sunday.
GROWING CROPS. See Mortgage
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Ante-nuptial Settlement- Validity of-lnsolvency -Fraudulent in-
tent.-An ante-nuptial settlement made by an insolvent man in considera.
tion of and as an inducement to the marriage, though intended by him
to hinder and delay his creditors, is, in the absence of evidence that the
wife was aware of the insolvency or of the fraudulent intent valid as
against his assignee in bankruptcy: Prewit v. Wilson, S. C. U. S., Oc-
tober Term 1880.
Divorce, as affecting Wife's Homestead Rights-Abandonment by
11usband of his Family-Ejectment.-Divorce obtained by the wife will
not deprive her of her homestead rights acquired during coverture in
her husband's land, where she continues to reside upon it with her
minor children: Blandy v. Asher, 72 Mo.
In the absence of evidence that a man who has abandoned his wife
and children and has suffered a divorce from his wife, has since acquired
a household elsewhere, a place which was his homestead at the time of
the abandonment and continues to be the residence of his children and
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their mother, will still, for the purpose of preserving the -ights of the
children, be treated as his homestead : Id.
A defendant in ejeetment cannot claim under the Homestead Act
land exceeding in value the statutory limit: .d.
Right of Wife to Elect against Will-Not barred by Release.-The
widow's statutory right to. elect the provision made for her by law in
lieu of 'that made by will, cannot be taken, from her either by the will
or by a deed of release executed by her to her husband during the
coverture: Wilber v. Wilber, 52 Wis.
Avoidance of Wife's Deed- Undue Influence- Unsupported Testimony
of Wife.-Where a note and mortgage by husband and wife, and the
certificate of acknowledgment of the mortgage by both, are perfectly
fair and regular on their face, a defence against them by the wife on the
ground that they were executed by her under undue influence and co-
ercion on the part of the husband, and that she never in fact acknowl-
edged the mortgage, can be sustained only upon perfectly clear, con-
vincing and satisfactory evidence ; in general, the u'nsupported testimony
of the wife alone will not be regarded as sufficient: Smith v. Allis, 52
Wis.
INSURANCE.
Parol Policies-Parol Variation of Written Contracts.-nsurance
policies are not required by law to be in writing, and outside of the
Statute of Frauds there is no rule of law which prevents written con-
tracts from being changed by parol: Roger Williams Ins. Co. v. Carring.
ton, 43 Mich.
INFANT. See Parent and Child.
INTOXICATION. See Negligence.
JUDGMENT.
Not Enjoined for Fraud of Complainant's Attorney.-A judgmenc
will not be set aside or enjoined at the instance of the losing party, on
the ground that he had intended to appeal from it, but was prevented
from perfecting his appeal through the fraudulent conduct of his own at-
torney, unless it distinctly appears that the complainant was damnified
by the failure to perfect the appeal : Dobbs v. St. Joseph Fire & Ma-
rine ns. Co., 72 Mo.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Tax.
Proof of Credits Avoiding.-When the Statute of Limitations is
relied on as a defence to a note, the plaintiff should not be permitted
to read in evidence credits endorsed on the note, without first proving
when the endorsements were made. When it is shown that they
were made at a time when it was against his interest to make them,
or that they were made by or with the consent of the payor, they will
be admissible, but nor if they were made by the holder himself with-
out the knowledge or consent of the payor, and there is no other proof
that the payments were then made: Goddard v. Williamson's Addmr.,
72 Mo.
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What not sufficient Promise to Bar.-The written -words, "I think I
see my way clear to pay you the $200 and interest I owe you, * * *
I am in hopes another two years will enable me from my present income
to clear off all pressing debts. * * * Rest assured that not a day of
pecuniary freedom will pass over my head without your hearing from
me," held, not to contain any promise of payment sufficient to remove
the bar of the Statute of Limitations : Pierce v. Seymour, 52 NXVis.
MORTGAGE.
Personal Property-Sale by Mortgagee-No Warranty of Title-
When Notice of Sale not Reguisite.-Where a mortgagee of personal
property sells the property not as his own, but held by him as a mortgagee,
he does not warrant the title. The rule of caveat emptor applies to all
persons desiring to purchase under such circumstances; and the pur-
chaser under such circumstances obtains only the interest of the mort-
gagor and mortgagee in the property : Harris v. Lynn, 25 Kans.
A mortgagee of personal property may sell his awn and the mort-
gagor's interest in the property, with the consent of the mortgagor,
without giving public notice of the sale: Id.
And when the mortgage contains a provision that the mortgagee may
sell the property after condition broken, or if at any time he should
deem himself unsafe, he may sell the property at public or private sale
previous to the time above mentioned; held, that no notice is required,
and that a sale without notice will transfer to the purchaser all the in-
terct, both of the mortgagor and mortgagee, in the property : Id.
Removal of Growing Crops after Foreclosure-A foreclosure deed
to the mortgagee gives him the same estate as a foreclosure of the equity
of redemption, and is as effective as against the owner of the equity as
if executed by such owner; Ruggles v. First National Bank of Cen-
treville, 43 Mich.
Growing crops pass with the soil under foreclosure deed, and on
proper application the court may perhaps provide for their preservation
until possession is given to the purchaser: Id.
NEGLIGENCE.
Contributory-Intozication.Evidence.-In an action for injuries from
negligence, if the person injured was, at the time of the injury, intoxi-
cated in any degree, the fact is proper to be considered by the jury in
determining the question of contributory negligence; and a judgment
for plaintiff is reversed for an instruction to the effect that "1the fact of
intoxication alone" would not "prove contributory negligence," unless
the proof showed such a degree of intoxication that 
" imbecility would
begin to affect" the intoxicated person-such instruction being regarded
as liable to mislead the jury: Fitzgerald v. Town of Weston, 52 Wis.
PARENT AND CHILD.
Custody of Child-To whom Awarded.-It is the duty of a court
whenever the possession and custody of minor children is sought by
habeas corpus, to make such order for their care and custody as the best
interests of the children may require, and to that end may commit them
to the custody of other than a parent, and this notwithstanding the fact
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that in a decree of divorce they were committed to the care and custody of
either father or mother. Such a decree may bind the parents inter sese.
but does not conclude the court as to the best interests of the children:
In the Matter of Bart, 25 Kans.
PARTITION.
Sale after Expiration of Order of Sale is Void.-An order of sale
in partition expires with the term at which the sale is required to be
made, and if for want of bidders, no sale takes place at that term, a re-
newal of the order must be procured before any further steps can be taken.
A sale at a subsequent term without such renewal is void: Htughes v.
Hughes, 72 Mo.
PARTNERSHIP. See Evidence.
Partnership Accounting-Disposition of Lands-Partition.-Lands
that are part of a common partnership stock have in equity the character
of personalty; and the legal title thereto is subordinated to the incidents
of partnership funds and accounting: Godfrey v. White et al., 43 Mich.
Proceedings between partners fbr an accounting are always for the
principal purpose of reaching a statement of money balances and a di-
vision of assets as personalty, and being essentially a personal and not
a real bontroversy, may be carried on in courts within whose jurisdiction
the parties live and do business, irrespective of the location of the part-
nership lands: Id.
Provision in Will of Partner for Continuance of-Extent of Lia-
bility-Subsequent Dividends to Legatees-Assignee in Bankruptcy.-
A testator may authorize the continuance of a partnership in which he
was engaged without subjecting any more of his property to the vicissi-
tudes of the business than what was embarked in it at the time of his
death, and if dividends honestly and fairly made and which do not di-
minish the capital of the concern, are afterwards paid to his legatees
under the provisions of his will, such dividends cannot, upon the subse-
quent bankruptcy of the firm, be recovered back by the assignee in
bankruptcy: Jones v. Walker, S. C. U. S., October Term 1880.
PUBLIC OFICER. See Surety.
, RAILROAD.
Damages for Land taken-Portion of Tract.-Plaintiff appealed
from the decision and award of the commissioners as to the appraise-
ment of value and assessment of damages for the right of way of the
Kansas City E. & S. Railroad Company's railroad, through and across
a certain quarter section of land belonging to him. He was the owner
of three hundred and sixty acres, lying in a body and used for the
purpose of a stock-ranch. The railroad ran nearly diagonally through
one quarter section, and cut off the water, timber, the house and corrals
from the main body of land, but did not touch the other quarters of
the ranch. A regularly laid out public highway separated the quarter
through which the railroad ran from one whole section. Held, the
landowner, on the appeal, was entitled to recover the damages for the
injury to the whole property, and not merely for that to the separate
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
quarter ever which the railroad was built: Kansas City E. & S. Ra7.
road Co. v. Merrill, 25 Kans.
SHERIFF'S SALE.
Relief against Mistake-Action against Defendant in Execution.-
The doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply to sheriff's sales where
there is a mistake made both by the sheriff and the purchaser, in selling
a tract of land to which the defendant in the execution has no title.
In such case, since the consideration for the money paid on the exe-
cution has failed, and the money has gone to extinguish the defendant's
debt, the purchaser may recover it back from him; and it is not essen-
tial that the purchaser shall have made improvements upon the land (as
was the case in McLean v. Martin, 45 Mio. 393); it is enough if the
money has passed out of the sheriffs hands before the mistake is dis-
.overed: Wilchinski v. Cavender, 72 Mo.
SALVAGE. See Errors and Appeals.
SUNDAY.
Sunday Note.-A note made on Sunday is not void at common law,
and in a suit on a foreign note any foreign statute invalidating it must
be proved: O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 43 Mich.
SURETY.
Public Officer-Judgment Against not Conclusive on Sureties.-An
order or judgment of amercement against a sheriff is only prima facie
and not conclusive against his sureties: Fay v. Edmiston, 25 Kans.
In an action against the sureties the question is not, whether the
judgment against the sheriff was obtained by fraud, collusion or mis.
take, but whether, upon the facts as they really existed, there was any
liability. The judgment is prima facie evidence of the truth of the
charges, but those charges are open to inquiry. The question is not
how the judgment against the sheriff was obtained, but ought it, upon
the facts, to have been obtained. Was there in truth a breach of the
bond: .d.
Unauthorized Extension of Time by Bank-Surety not discharged.-
Where a promissory note, upon which three persons are liable-one as
principal debtor, and the other two as sureties-is placed by the owner
thereof in a bank for collection ; and, after the note has become due,
an agreement is made between the officers of the bank and the principal
debtor, that, in consideration of the sum of $40, to be paid to the offi-
cers of the bank, to be applied in part payment of the amount due on
the note, and in consideration of the further sum of $1, to be paid to the
officers of the bank for their time and trouble in doing the business,
the time for the payment of said note should be extended for some
months, and said sums are .paid, and the time for the payment of the
note is, in consideration thereof, extended in accordance with the said
agreement, and said officers had authority from the owner of the note to
extend the time for the payment thereof upon receiving a partial payment
of the amount due thereon, but did not have authority to extend the
time for such payment upon any other consideration whatever, and said
extension of time of payment was without the knowledge or consent of
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the sureties. and the agreement to receive the said $1, and the re-
ception thereof, was without the knowledge or consent of the owner of
the note. Held, that this extension of the time for the payment of the
note did not release the sureties : Prather v. Gammon, 25 Kans.
TRESPASS..
Trespass for cutting Timber-Passage of Title.-Under a contract
transferring all the pine trees the vendee " may choose to take," the
latter agreeing to pay a certain sum " for the said pine so cut," &c., title
did not pass until the pine was cut, and until then the vendee had neither
actual nor constructive possession, and could not bring trespass for*
damages against a grantee of the vendor who had cut timber on the
land: Pfistner v. Bird, 43 lich.
TAX.
Statute of Limitatio.s- Ilh en it commences to run against Tax
Titles-interest.-The date of the recording of the tax deed is the time at
which the Statute of' Limitations begins to run in tax title cases, and
this time is not changed by the fact that the holder of the tax sale cer-
tificate did not obtain and record his deed on the day he was legally
entitled to it: Estes v. Stebblins, 25 Kans.
The provision requiring fifty per cent. interest upon a redemption
from a tax sale is not unconstitutional : Id.
TRIAL.
Suibmission to Court without a Jury-Subsequent Amendment of .Aarr.
-Refusal to Vacate Submssio -Discret ion of Court.-Where a case
has been submitted to the court without a jury, and at the close of the
testimony plaintiff asks and obtains leave to amend his declaration, it is
within the discretion of the court to grant or deny a motion of defend-
ant to vacate the submission and allow a jury trial, and where neither
the nature of the case nor the real issue is changed by the amendment
a refusal of such motion, is not ground for reversal: Bamberger v.
Terry, S. 0. U. S., October Term 1880.
VERDICT.
When Sufficiently Certan.-In an action upon an insurance policy,
a verdict for the full amount of the policy, with six per cent. interest
and ten per cent. damages for vexatious delay (the latter imposed by
statutory authority), is sufficiently certain without stating the figures;
the amount of the policy, and the date from which interest is to be
calculated, being shown by the proceedings and the amount of the
judgment to be entered being, therefore, ascertainable by a simple
arithmetical calculation: Re fe v. Wison, S. C. U. S., October Term
1880.
WAREHOUSEMAN.
Issuing of Receipts by- Title of Depositor not Guaranteed.-A
warehouseman, issuing warehouse-receipts for goods deposited, is not a
guarantor to the assignee of the receipt, of the title of the depositor o
the goods: Mechanics' and 9Traders' Ins. Co. v. Kiger, S. 0. U. S.,
October Term 1880.
